Decisions for submissions to FEW2019 have been made. Of 86 submissions, we have accepted 20 papers as contributed talks and six more submissions for special format sessions (proof of concept, tutorials). The list of accepted papers is below.

A precise schedule, including poster presentations and commentators, will be published at a later stage.

Contributed Papers

  • Francesco Berto (University of St. Andrews and ILLC, Amsterdam) and Aybüke Özgün (ILLC, Amsterdam):
    “Dynamic Hyperintensional Belief Revision”
  • Gustavo Cevolani (IMT Lucca):
    “Rational belief, probability, and truthlikeness: a plea for strong fallibilism”
  • Anna-Maria A. Eder (University of Cologne) and Peter Brössel (Ruhr University Bochum):
    “Evidence of Evidence as Higher-Order Evidence”
  • Benjamin Eva (University of Konstanz), Ted Shear (University of Queensland, Brisbane) and Branden Fitelson (Northeastern University, Boston):
    “Four Approaches to Supposition”
  • Peter Hawke (ILLC, Amsterdam):
    “Missed Clues and Relevant Alternatives”
  • Jason Konek (University of Bristol):
    “Epistemic Interpretivism”
  • Travis Lacroix (University of California, Irvine and Montreal Institute for Learning Algorithms):
    “The Correction Game or, How Pre-Evolved Communicative Dispositions Might Affect Communicative Dispositions”
  • Annina Loets (Oxford University):
    “Choice Points for a Logic of Normality”
  • Conor Mayo-Wilson, Aditya Saraf and Soham Pardeshi (University of Washington, Seattle):
    “QUOL: Qualitative, Objective Likelihoodism”
  • Julien Murzi, Leonie Eichhorn and Philipp Mayr (University of Salzburg):
    “Surprise surprise: KK is innocent”
  • Barbara Osimani (Marche Polytechnical University, Ancona) and Jürgen Landes (LMU Munich):
    “Varieties of Error and Varieties of Evidence in Scientific Inference”
  • Lorenzo Rossi (University of Salzburg), Paul Égré (CNRS/Paris Sorbonne) and Jan Sprenger (University of Turin):
    “De Finettian Logics of Indicative Conditionals”
  • Hans Rott (University of Regensburg):
    “Difference-making conditionals and the Relevant Ramsey Test”
  • Miriam Schoenfield (MIT, Cambridge/MA):
    “Accuracy and Verisimilitude: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly”
  • Julia Staffel (University of Colorado, Boulder):
    “Pro Tem Rationality”
  • Tom Sterkenburg (LMU Munich) and Rianne De Heide (CWI, Amsterdam).
    “The Truth-Convergence of Open-Minded Bayesianism”
  • Reuben Stern (Leibniz University Hannover):
    “An Interventionist’s Guide to Exotic Choice”
  • Rush Stewart (LMU Munich) and Michael Nielsen (Columbia University, New York):
    “On the Possibility of Testimonial Justice”
  • Jeremy Strasser (Australian National University, Canberra):
    “Is Almost Everywhere Convergence an Epistemic Ideal?”
  • Olav Benjamin Vassend (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore):
    “Justifying the Norms of Inductive Inference”

Proof of Concept Sessions

The proof of concept sessions present new approaches to classical problems, often transferred from different (sub)disciplines (e.g., statistics, game theory, ethics). Their goal is to enrich the set of methods and techniques in formal epistemology and to bring them to the attention of a wider audience.

  • Jesse Clifton (North Carolina State University, Raleigh):
    “Reliable credence and the foundations of statistics”
  • Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro and Bryan Frances (Hong Kong University):
    “The Significance of Economics for the Epistemology of Peer Disagreement”
  • Patricia Rich (University of Hamburg) and Hailin Liu (Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangdong):
    “Reconciling Individual and Group Rationality Through Strategic Reasoning”
  • Brian Talbot (University of Colorado, Boulder):
      “Formal deontological epistemology: advantages and challenges”


  • Seamus Bradley (University of Leeds):
    “Belief Models and Their Aggregation”
  • Vincenzo Crupi (University of Turin):
    “Entropy, Information and Bayesian Inference”